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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is twofold: first, to give the reader an understanding of
the basic principles of command and control architecture design, and second, to analyze
the current structure of a typical ship's Damage Control organization and its ability to
combat Mass Conflagrations. This will be accomplished by first providing the
methodology of architectural analysis, and then applying this methodology step-by-step
to the environment and organization in question.
The intent of this thesis is to provide a generic guide to improvements that could
be implemented on a ship at the lower levels, and to introduce a somewhat different
perspective on the Navy's Damage Control philosophy.
B. BACKGROUND
The Damage Control organization onboard today's ships is a formal organization
designed to cope with nearly every type of structural emergency, from fire and flooding
to chemical and biological attacks. Due to the great number of ships that were lost to
progressive flooding in World War II, the Navy placed its emphasis on battling the type
of danger in which the damage, if unchecked, would slowly spread out to adjoining areas
of the ship, eventually causing complete combat degradation. In light of the relatively
unsophisticated weapons and warheads being faced at the time, this was a sound principle.
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and it worked quite well for decades. Within the last five years, however, the ability of
anti-ship weaponry such as cruise missiles and advanced torpedoes to inflict massive
damage upon impact has raised serious doubts as to ship survivability. The attack on the
USS STARK by a French-made Exocet missile and the damage caused to the USS
SAMUEL B. ROBERTS by a relatively cheap Iranian mine highlight the concern over
the ability of today's ships to survive a single hit.
On a less dramatic level, Fleet Training Group (FTG) routinely runs each ship
undergoing refresher training through a Mass Conflagration (MASS CONFLAG) Exercise.
Most ships have difficulty passing this graded exercise, and many ships fail. According
to the Senior Damage Control Instructor at FTG San Diego, two of the most common
reasons for failure are:
• The weak control and supervision of the ship's force personnel during the Mass
Conflagration is too slow and unresponsive to be effective.
• The average crewmember did not know where to go or what to do if he was not
assigned to a locker, and received very little guidance from the chain of command.
[Ref. 1]
While the reasons for failure are varied, most of the fault for the above listed items
can be traced back to the inability of the Damage Control organization to adapt to the
situation and properly manage the ship's force in fighting the conflagration. The ships
that are successful, meanwhile, have almost universally altered and restructured their
Damage Control teams into more flexible, adaptive organizations. [Ref. 1] The problem
that arises regarding these successes is that they lack continuity; rarely if ever does the
same successful plan get used on more than one ship, and even on the same ship the plan
will change or be forgotten due to a rotation of leadership. This thesis is intended to
provide a design framework whereby a ship's leadership could not only design
fundamental organizational changes to its Damage Control structure, it could also format
these changes into a basic template that could be retained to provide "corporate
knowledge" of the solution.
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Each chapter will lead the reader systematically from the basics of architecture
design through their application to the proposed solutions. A brief description of each
chapter is given below.
1. Chapter I
Chapter I provides a brief discussion of the purposes of the thesis and a
general background of the current problem being analyzed.
2. Chapter U
Chapter II will describe the basic principles, terms, and definitions used in
designing a Command and Control architecture, and will illustrate the ways in which
these can be applied to existing organizations. The focus here will be on establishing a
fundamental framework by which to break down the Damage Control organization and
its associated environment into parameters that can be quantified and compared.
3. Chapter HI
Chapter III will apply the established definitions to two different scenarios:
the Main Space Fire (MSF), a common term for a fire in the ship's engineering spaces
and one that the Navy has a formal, effective doctrine to combat, and the Mass
Conflagration (Mass Conflag), a fire in which often more that one third of the ship is
damaged, and one for which there exists no formal doctrine. These two scenarios will
be compared, and all parametric changes quantified within the architectural design
framework.
4. Chapter IV
This chapter will continue with the architectural analysis, expressing the typical
Damage Control organization in terms of the defined framework and determining in
which particular areas the organization is unable to cope with change in environment from
Main Space Fire to Mass Conflagration.
5. Chapter V
Finally, Chapter V will use the results of the above analysis to propose
possible solutions and/or adaptations to the current organization in order to make it more
viable and responsive to the increased threat environment. All of these proposed
adaptations will be referenced with respect to both the tenets of architectural design and
their "real world" application.
n. ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN
A. DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Before beginning to define an organization or an environment, certain basic
principles must be examined. These principles are inherent in nearly all aspects of
architectural design, and are necessary to the creation of an organization that can survive
and be successful in a given environment.
1. The System-in-Focus
The main thrust behind the concept of the system-in-focus is that, given that
a particular system is the focus of attention, boundaries must be drawn around that
system. By defining the boundaries around a system, anything that falls within those
boundaries is part of the system, while anything outside those boundaries is part of the
environment. Figure 1 illustrates this concept. Boundaries are particularly important, as
they allow the designer to avoid confusing the interrelated forces of other organizations
as part of the system itself.
Communications across these boundaries between the system and the
environment must often be altered, or reinterpreted, in order to fit into the
communications pattern of the system-in-focus. This process is known as transduction,
and the mechanisms that perform this task are called transducers.
2. The Design Problem
Once the system has been bounded, it is necessary to define exactly what the
organization being designed is required to do. To this end, the architectural design
problem should be stated in a way that takes into account the environment, any and all
resources, and the actual design itself. [Ref. 2:pp. 21-22] The problem itself is frequently
expressed in terms of an equation, an example of which is shown in Figure 2.
3. Functional Analysis
For each subsystem block of the system-in-focus, there is a corresponding
functional task. The Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) breaks down the
inputs to each into controls, resources, and inputs from other tasks, with outputs to other
tasks. This function box, and its attendant inputs and outputs, is shown in Figure 3. By
using this method of functional analysis, it is possible to trace each and every major task
faced by the organization as a whole, and decompose it into smaller tasks, thus showing
a direct chain of action and pointing out to the designer possible conflicts, chokepoints,
etc.
4. Equilibrium and Stability
The basic idea of equilibrium is a balancing of forces (both organizational and
environmental) in such a way that there is little or no change, i.e., equilibrium exists
when the system-in-focus is in balance with its environment. [Ref. 3:p. 13] Stability is
the property of a system that causes it to return to equilibrium whenever outside events
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Figure 3: The SADT Function Box
its subsequent behavior upon the introduction of a change of state in the environment.
Note that in a stable organization the tendency is always towards equilibrium, and each
oscillatory response must be smaller than the one before. [Ref. 3:p. 16]
5. Variety and Information
The concept of variety was developed in order to measure complexity by
focusing on all of the states of nature present in the environment, and is tied directly to
information processing. In terms of architectural design, information and data are vital
concepts. Information is defined as that which alters or reinforces understanding [Ref.
4:p. 309], while data are merely the discernible "bits" of the perceived environment. High
data quantity does not necessarily mean that information quantity is high as well;
voluminous data may contain little in the way of semantic content. Concurrent with the
idea of information quantity is information richness, a concept that is a measure of the
amount of understandable knowledge of the environment which is being conveyed via a
particular communication method. High information richness is often associated with
qualitative information, while low information richness can be associated with more
quantitative information.
Variety is also used in designing systems to ensure that the system will remain
in equilibrium with its environment. [Ref 3:p. 14] This is accomplished by ensuring that
each subsystem can match each subenvironment in its variety level. These variety levels
can be measured and compared either quantitatively or qualitatively, as long as the
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Figure 4: Organizational Equilibrium and Stability
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to cope with environmental variety lead to the following fundamental precepts, or axioms,
of architectural design:
• A viable system-in-focus is designed such that the environmental variety is
absorbed.
• All channels carrying information between the command and control function, the
operations function, and the environment must have a higher capacity to transmit
information at the relevant variety level than the functions or environment can
generate. The same holds true for all transducers whose function is to transmit
information across boundaries.
• The system must not only be able to absorb all variety generated by the
environment, it must also be able to absorb any variety generated by each
subsystem.
• The operation of the above three principles must be cyclically maintained through
time without hiatus or lag.
B. DEFINING THE ENVIRONMENT
As mentioned before, the environment includes anything outside the boundaries of
the organization. In order to design an architecture capable of dealing with the
environment, it is necessary to fully define the relevant characteristics of the environment,
so that they may be combined and categorized. [Ref. 5:p. 294] By doing this, it is
possible to build a framework with which to analyze the environment.
1. Variable Characteristics
In general, state variables are used to describe all aspects of the environment.
They can represent specific, discrete items such as tanks, missiles, etc., or they can
represent the relative size of entities within the environment, such as windspeed or
damage level. Diversity is the quantitative measure of the number of state variables
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present in the environment, while complexity is a measure of the number, and sometimes
type, of interrelationships existing between the state variables. [Ref. 6:p. 143]
2. Time Characteristics
The idea of time span is to ensure that the system is designed to remain viable
for as long as the environment will exist in its current state; in addition, the system design
should not exceed the planning horizon, as this calls for resources and/or methods that are
not necessarily needed. [Ref. 7:p. 95] Time span can be measured as either discrete or
continuous. During this time span the environmental state variables will change in either
number or nature, and this is quantitatively expressed as the average time rate of change
of the environment.
3. Hostility
Hostility is simply the malevolence of the environment; however, it is
important to note that hostility as defined here implies intelligence, and an antagonist who
is actively causing changes to the state variables of the environment. For example, a
hurricane might seem on the surface to be quite hostile, but because of the lack of
intelligent direction it is considered to have no hostility for the purposes of architectural
design. Hostility tends to increase the number of state variables, their complexity, and
their diversity.
4. An Environmental Analytical Framework
By combining the above characteristics of diversity, complexity, and hostility
into one general characteristic called variance [Ref. 6:p. 147], an analytical framework can
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be constructed by comparing variance to the time rate of change in an environment. The
results of this comparison yield a measure of the level of variety present in the
environment. As shown in Figure 5, if variance is classified as ranging from simple to
complex, and time rate of change is similarly classified as ranging from static to dynamic,
then the combination of these two yield levels of variety ranging from simple-static (low
variety) to complex-dynamic (high variety). Thus, the environmental variety can be
evaluated, and taken into account during the organizational design process.
C. DEFINING THE ORGANIZATION
1. Technology
For any given organization, technology represents the interactive relationship
between the inputs, such as intelligence data, and outputs such as manpower. The
technology of an organization determines its ability to process, as well as transmit, variety
from the environment. This ability, as illustrated in Figure 6, is a direct function of two
factors - variety handling capacity (VHC) and analyzability.
a. Variety Handling Capacity
The ability to process variety to and from the environment is a direct
indicator of an organization's effectiveness, and is one of the most critical factors in
organizational design. This capacity is directly related to the quantity of information that


























Figure 6: Organization/Environment Interaction
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b. Analyzability
Analyzability is the level to which the workings of the organization can
be understood. Since this understanding increases as information processing becomes less
complex, analyzability is inversely related to the richness of the information processed
by an organization. Figure 7 shows the relationships between the above-mentioned
factors.
c. Types of Organizational Technology
By combining analyzability and variety handling capacity, four separate
types of organizational technologies emerge: Craft, Routine, Nonroutine, and Engineering.
[Ref. 7:p. 78-79] These technologies and their relationship to analyzability and variety
handling capacity are illustrated in Figure 8.
(1) Routine. Routine technology has a high degree of analyzability and
a low variety handling capacity, while processing very little low-richness information.
The tasks faced are relatively simple, and the information processed is quantitative, as in
the case of a mass-production line. [Ref. 6:p. 192]
(2) Craft. Craft technology has a low analyzability and low variety
handling capacity, while a low quantity of very rich information can be handled. While
the tasks remain simple in nature, a relatively high degree of qualitative information is






















































Figure 8: Organizational Technology Framework
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(3) Nonroutine. This type of technology has a low analyzability and a
high variety handling capacity, while a large quantity of rich information can be
processed. Nonroutine technology involves tasks that are complex in nature, and a high
degree of qualitative infonnation is required. Examples of this are a corporate think-tank
or a troubleshooting team. [Ref. 6:p. 195]
(4) Engineering. Engineering technology, like nonroutine, has a high
variety handling capacity, but is much more analyzable. While a large quantity of
information can be processed, it is not information of a very high richness. This type of
technology involves tasks that are complex, but primarily quantitative, such as in the case
of accounting firms or statistical analysis. [Ref. 7:p. 82]
2. Command and Control Characteristics of a Technology
In order for the organization or system to be viable, that is, to be able to
effectively interact and cope with its environment, certain characteristics must be
determined about the type of organizational technology currently in use by that
organization. These characteristics are:
(1) Flexibility. This characteristic ranges from very flexible (organic)
to inflexible (mechanistic).
(2) Formalization. The degree to which procedures are governed by a
documented set of criteria is called formalization. [Ref. 6:p. 211] Formalization is
inversely related to variety handling capacity.
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(3) Centralization. Centralization is indicative of the level within the
organization at which decisions are made. As decision making gets closer to the top of
the heirarchy, centralization increases. [Ref. 6:p. 212]
(4) Skill level ofpersonnel. In general, as the skill level of individuals
within the operational portion of the organization grows, the skill level of the comand &
control portion must increase proportionally
(5
)
Span of control. This characteristic is a measure of the number of
personnel reporting to and working for an individual supervisor. Variety handling
capacity increases as the span of control narrows, as each supervisor is able to better
monitor the actions and environment of his subordinates.
(6) Communciation and coordination. In order for an organization to
increase its variety handling capacity, the quantity of communication and coordination
within the organization must likewise increase. This area is addressed more fully later
in the chapter.
Table 1 provides a comparison of the four types of operational technologies





Characteristic Routine Craft Engineering Nonroutine
Flexibility Mech. Organic Mech. Organic
Formalization High Moderate Moderate Low



















3. Decision Making and Uncertainty
The decision making process of an organization relates directly to many of the
command and control characteristics mentioned in the previous section. Organizational
decision making is the process or processes by which the organization identifies and
solves problems. As uncertainty increases, organizational complexity and internal
dynamics must increase. [Ref. 8:p. 616] These two major factors - problem identification
and problem solution - are tied directly to the concepts of goal consensus and technical
knowledge. Organizations use information to clarify a situation and come to a consensus
about how to react. [Ref. 9:p. 554-555] Goal consensus is simply the degree to which
the members of the organization are able to agree on where the problem lies. If goal
consensus is high, then the level of uncertainty surrounding problem identification is
comparatively low, while low goal consensus makes problem identification very uncertain.
Technical knowledge represents the degree of understanding between the organization's
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actions and the results of those actions, i.e., the cause-and-effect relationships. When
technical knowledge is high, problem solution is relatively certain, while low technical
knowledge creates high uncertainty in solving problems.
The above factors of technical knowledge and goal consensus combine to form
four different models of organization decision-making processes: the Garbage Can Model,
the Carnegie Model, the Management Science Model, and the Incremental Decision
Model. These models and how they are related to technical knowledge and goal
consensus are shown in Figure 9. [Ref. 4:p. 363]
a. The Garbage Can Model
This model represents low levels of both goal consensus and technical
knowledge, and could be referred to as "organized anarchies". [Ref. 10:p. 285] Problem
identification and problem solution are both difficult, and little if any formal
standardization exists to aid the decision makers. This type of decision making involves
decisions and choices being made at nearly every level of the organization. [Ref. 4:p. 373]
b. The Carnegie Model
This model, developed at Carnegie Mellon University, involves low goal
consensus, but high technical knowledge - once the problem is identified, a solution will
relatively easy to find. This type of decision-making process entails coalitions within the
organization bargaining and negotiating in order to determine the organization's goals.
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Figure 10: The Carnegie Decision-Making Model
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c. The Incremental Decision Model
This model represents nearly the opposite of the Carnegie model - goal
consensus is high, but technical knowledge is low. In essence, the organization is certain
of the problem, but is unsure on how to solve it. In order to reduce the detrimental
effects of making a wrong decision, a process of trial-and-error is used, whereby each
decision is evaluated, and the next decision is made on the basis of this evaluation. [Ref.
4:p. 369] An example of this process is shown in Figure 1 1
.
d. The Management Science Model
The Management Science Model involves the combination of high goal
consensus and high technical knowledge - problem identification and problem solution
are both relatively straightforward. In this model a rational, computed decision is reached
by the decision makers, often based on a prior formal doctrine or methodology. [Ref. 4:p.
364] While no decision process is completely devoid of personal judgement, this type
of process comes the closest to programmed decision making.
An integrated framework describing the various levels and types of uncertainty,
as well as the decision making processes associated with them, can be constructed through
the combinations of goal consensus and technical knowledge. An integrated
organizational decision making framework combining the four types of models with
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Figure 12: The Integrated Organizational Decision Making Model
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4. Internal Dynamics
Internal dynamics describes the interactions between and within the various
heirarchal levels of an organization. Encompassed within this realm are the concepts of
coordination, linkage, and interdependence. These three areas are themselves interrelated,
and many basic philosophies that govern the role of a particular type of linkage
arrangement will also come into play for a certain style of interdependence. [Ref. 3:p.
188]
a. Coordination Methods
Having established a framework for the decision-making process, it is
now necessary to explore the internal dynamics by which the organization provides
information, support, and direction. In order to provide unity of effort, the decision
makers within an organization must have some way of integrating their decisions to meet
the intent of the organization as a whole. In general, there are four types of cordination:
direct supervision, mutual adjustment, standardization, and ideology. [Ref. 7:p. 48]
(1) Direct Supervision. This method of coordination consists of a
centralized, individual authority to whom all subordinates provide information. In turn,
the central authority makes all decisions, and passes these back down to the lower levels
of the chain of command.
(2) Mutual Adjustment. Mutual adjustment occurs when two or more
individuals possessing no formal heirarchal authority with respect to one another solve
28
problems and share resources together. Even in a hierarchy, mutual support may still take
place with respect to minor decisions and/or problems.
(3) Standardization. Coordination via standardization involves a
formalized set of routines or procedures which govern the decision-making of some or
all levels within an organization. This can occur through many methods such as
instruction, regulations, doctrine, etc.
(4) Ideology. Ideology is simply a set of values or mores that govern
and influence the behavior of the organization. This coordination may or may not be
formal, but in either case is designed to create a strong sense of unity of purpose within
the organization.
While the four types of coordination described above are separate and distinct,
they are by no means mutually exclusive. Many organizations employ most if not all of
these methods, especially in cases where the size of the organization is considerable, or
where timeliness of action is a factor. Nor can one particular type of coordination
necessarily be thought of as "better", or more important, than another. For instance, the
constant, daily influence of ideology might not seem to have as much effect on a soldier
or sailor as the impact of a direct order from his superior, but it is the ideological basis
of the environment in which he lives that gives the person the underlying framework of
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Figure 13: Coordination Methods
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b. Linkage
Linkage is a concept that defines the method or methods whereby control,
direction, and support are accomplished. There are two types of linkage: vertical and
horizontal. [Ref. 6:p. 21] Vertical linkage is established between different levels of the





Level or Positions Added to the Hierarchy
Vertical Information Systems
An important thing to remember about vertical linkage is that the linkage
within an organization must be able to handle at least as much variety as all of the
horizontal linkages below and above it. This information handling capacity is directly
related to the degree of vertical control and coordination required. The various forms of
vertical linkage, and their relationship to information handling capacity & degree of
control required, can be seen in Figure 14.
Horizontal linkage is associated with the mutual support that takes place
between the various sub-organizations on a particular level, and can take on many
different forms. This type of linkage is concerned primarily with the communication
which takes place among those elements on the same level in a hierarchy. As in the case



















Figure 14: Types and Capacities of Vertical Linkage
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Figure 15 shows the relationship between each of these forms of linkage
and its information capacity & degree of coordination required.
c. Interdependency
In terms of functional decomposition, each function area within an
organization must occasionally interact with another function area. The concept that
describes this interaction is interdependency. Interdependency is similar to linkage in that
it describes the manner in which different groups coordinate; however, linkage is
concerned with communications and coordination among groups, while interdependency
relates to the allocation of resources between the different functions associated with those
groups. There are three styles of interdependency, and each depends in large part on the
type of coordination and communications demand that exist within the organization, and
the nature of the decision-making processes taking place at the appropriate levels.
















Figure 15: Types and Capacities of Horizontal Linkage
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of interdependcies, each taking place at different levels within the organizational
hierarchy. These three classes of interdependency are described below, and are illustrated
in Figure 16. [Ref. 2:p. 21] The relationship between these various interdependencies and
certain C2 characteristics is shown in Table 2.
(1) Pooled Interdependency. When little communication (except
concerning a pooled resource) is required, and a number of groups can operate
independently with little or no horizontal coordination, then pooled interdependency
usually exists. In this method, resources are combined into a common "pool" and each
function area takes scarce resources from the pool as needed. Organizational units do not
need to be very close in proximity in order to utilize this method, but the information
processing capacity is relatively low. This type of interdependency is similar to a "Star"
network. [Ref. 12:p. 168]
(2) Serial Interdependency. In this method, functional areas operate
such that the output and/or resources of one function becomes the resources and input of
another, and so on. This type of scheme is equivalent to a linear network, [Ref. 12:p.
168] and has a moderate information and variety handling capacity. Units must be closer
in proximity than those using pooled interdependence.
(3) Reciprocal Interdependency. In this mode, function areas mutually
dependent on one another, and the input/output are looped, much as if a serial "chain"
were joined to another serial chain, but running in the opposite direction. This setup is
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Figure 16: Types of Interdependency
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very close proximity in order for it to work, this type of interdependency can process the
most information, and therefore handle the most variety.
TABLE 2
























We have now established an analytical framework with which to define an
organization and determine the amount of variety it is able to process. The single most
important quality of an effective, viable command and control system is its ability to
"absorb", or cope with, its environment, and this ability is best expressed in terms of
variety handling capacity. This capacity in turn is influenced by a number of factors, and
is a result of the combination of these factors. Figure 17 recaps some of the more
important aspects covered in this chapter, and shows their relationship to variety handling
capacity. By determining exactly which characteristics an organization possesses, and to
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what degree it possesses them, a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of that
organization can be performed. In addition, by comparing an organization to the
environment it must cope with, it is possible to pinpoint those areas and properties that



































Figure 17: Organizational Characteristics versus Variety Handling Capacity
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in. ANALYZING THE DAMAGE CONTROL ENVIRONMENT
A. TWO SCENARIOS: MAIN SPACE FIRE AND MASS CONFLAGRATION
Throughout the next section, two types of environmental scenarios will be described
and compared: the Main Space Fire (MSF) and the Mass Conflagration (Mass Conflag).
The Main Space Fire is particularly useful for comparison, because, like the Mass
Conflag, it is an extremely hazardous fire with far-reaching impact upon the ship's
operational readiness. Unlike the Mass Conflag, however, the Main Space Fire is more
straightforward. As its name implies, a Main Space Fire is one that occurs in primary
engineering spaces such as the Engine Room, Machinery Rooms, etc. Since the number
of spaces is relatively small, the actions of nearly every member of the DC organization
can be pre-scripted to a large degree; in fact, every ship has and maintains a Main Space
Fire Doctrine (MSFD), which details precisely the required actions and procedures for a
fire in each engineering space onboard. For instance, the MSFD lists each and every
valve, by number and location, that must be closed in order to achieve mechanical
isolation of the space, and every breaker and bus tie that must be thrown in order to
remove electrical power from the area. All potential hazards are readily identified, and
special precautions and warnings are posted for each step of the operation. It is this
fundamental difference that separates the two types of fires and highlights the deficiencies
of the average DC team to cope with a Mass Conflagration.
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B. STATE VARIABLES
The state variables apply to both scenarios, and are easily defined. They do not
need to be precisely quantified, and there is no specific equation available to determine
the exact amount and type of effort required to combat them. The state variables for our





Each of the above variables can be defined with respect to the two factors of
location and intensity. Figure 16 shows these two factors and their impact on the
importance of a state variable. While intensity is the primary factor affecting the relative
importance of a fire, location can, and often does, play a key role in determining the
urgency of effort needed. For instance, a small fire located in the ship's torpedo
magazine is certainly of more concern than any fire in an administrative workspace which
is relatively isolated from hazardous material storage areas.
C. EXPANSION AND GROWTH OF A FIRE
A key element in the difficulty of combating a large fire can be found in the
manner and nature by which a fire expands. Figure 17 shows a fire in a single space (A),
comprised of the four state variables. Assuming that expansion via conduction,






















Figure 18: State Variables and Factors
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Figure 19: Fire Expansion and Adjacency
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of spreading along six different paths. If this occurs, the number of locations, and
therefore the number of factors times state variables, increases by a factor of six. Should
the fire continue to spread to adjacent compartments along all available routes, the
number of state variables increases again by a factor of eighteen.
D. FITTING THE ENVIRONMENTS INTO AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
1. Variance
Having defined the state variables, it is now possible to rate the relative levels
of diversity and complexity inherent in the two environmental scenarios being analyzed.
Hostility, as it affects variance, is not a factor in this analysis, as a fire possesses no
intelligent direction and cannot be thought of as "hostile". Note, however, that a fire is
not totally random either; since a fire will spread in the direction of fuel and oxygen, its
movements can be somewhat predicted and countered.
As shown in the previous section, the Main Space Fire, since it primarily is
concerned with one space, contains few state variables, and, despite the inherent
complexity of an engineering space fire, is relatively simple in nature. Using the
illustration from the preceding section, a Mass Conflagration can be thought of as an
"instant expansion" into a far more complex environment, with a significantly greater
number of combinations of state variables and factors. As this diversity increases, the
complexity swells accordingly.
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2. Time Rate of Change
A Main Space Fire is quite dynamic at the start, but the use of automatic and
remote firefighting equipment such as Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) sprinklers
and Halon discharge systems virtually guarantee the containment of all but the most
severe engineering fires. In view of this, the Main Space Fire can be considered a
relatively static fire, with little chance of changing dramatically. No such installed
systems exist, however, for combatting a Mass Conflagration, and it is by definition a fire
out of control. Due to the size and intensity of the Mass Conflagration, it can spread
rapidly, and the threat can change dynamically.
3. Variety
Having now defined a Main Space Fire as simple-static, and a Mass
Conflagration as complex-dynamic, these two scenarios can be placed on the
Environmental Analytical Framework. As shown in Figure 18, this placement indicates
a low amount of variety for a Main Space Fire, while a Mass Conflagration is shown to
contain a high level of variety. This fundamental difference in variety level is a vital key
to analyzing the reason why an organization might be unable to cope with a Mass

















LOW SIMPLE COMPLEX > HIGH
VARIANCE
Figure 20: Environmental Analytical Framework (with Scenarios)
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IV. ANALYZING THE DAMAGE CONTROL ORGANIZATION
A. THE DAMAGE CONTROL ORGANIZATION
The Damage Control Organization onboard a ship is responsible for ensuring
that the ship does not suffer a loss of combat ability due to fire, flooding, or Chemical,
Biological, and Radiological (CBR) attack. There are few DC personnel whose sole
responsibility is Damage Control; rather, the organization consists of personnel from the
other departments and divisions throughout the ship. Before beginning an detailed
analysis of a ship's Damage Control organization, it is necessary to establish some basic
definitions and delineate the general makeup of certain components within the
organization. Certain features common to nearly every ship in the Navy are Damage
Control Central, the Repair Locker, and the Repair Party. The organizational makeup of
a typical Damage Control organization can be seen in Figure 21.
1. Damage Control Central
DC Central is the hub of the Damage Control network, and is normally located
near the main Engineering control center. From DC Central, the Damage Control
Assistant is able to monitor, evaluate, and control the damage and repair efforts of each
of the ship's Repair Lockers, as well as communicate directly to Engineering control and
the Bridge. While there is little in the way of damage control equipment per se in DC
























Figure 21: Damage Control Organizational Chart
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2. The Repair Locker
The Repair Locker is the basic organizational unit responsible for controlling
damage to the ship. In general, the ship is divided into a certain number of areas or
regions of responsibilities, and a Repair Locker is designated to handle each region. The
number of Repair Lockers onboard is directly proportional to the size of the vessel. Each
Repair Locker is managed by a Repair Locker Leader, with various phone talkers,
messengers, and plotters to assist in the control of the locker.
The Repair Locker contains all of the equipment, personnel, etc. necessary to
contain and control typical damage within its area of responsibility. Resource allocation
is usually the same in each Locker, although certain special function Repair Lockers, such
as Repair V (Engineering spaces) and Repair VIII (Electronics) contain additional special
equipment and personnel. In addition to repair parties, each locker normally has assigned
to it at least one Electrician's Mate (EM), one corpsman (HM), and two Hull Technicians
(HT). Figure 22 shows a breakdown of some of the personnel assignments and duties
found within a Repair Locker.
3. The Repair Party
The Repair Party is a designated collection of ship's force personnel created
to perform a specific task. Each party is normally led by an On Scene Leader (OSL),
whose primary responsibilities are to control the actions of his team and to report to the
Locker Leader. Since the number of personnel within a Repair Locker is often limited,
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Figure 22: Repair Locker/Party Assignments
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Locker, e.g., the #1 Nozzleman in the Fire Party might also serve as the Box Patch man
for a Flooding Party, or serve as the mechanical isolator for another fire party. Some of
the Repair Party assignments can also be found in Figure 22.
B. THE SYSTEM-IN-FOCUS
In the scenarios as defined, the system in focus is the command and control
hierarchy that extends from the Damage Control Assistant (DCA) in Damage Control
Central down to the On Scene Leader (OSL) at the actual site of the fire. This, in turn,
establishes the actual boundaries of the system, thereby relegating all external factors such
as the ship's combat and operational chain of command, in addition to the fire itself, to
the environment. Figure 23 shows a diagram of the system-in-focus described above, as
well as the normal sound-powered communications used by the system. Note that the
simplified organization shown in this figure can be increased in size simply by adding
more repair lockers in order to represent the DC organization on larger platforms. Due
to the varying nature of the size of Damage Control organizations within the fleet and in
order to keep the following analysis generic, this figure is kept relatively simplified.
C. THE DESIGN PROBLEM
The design problem, as normally stated, must be modified in order to reflect the
actual goal of the DC organization. The effectiveness of Damage Control onboard a ship
depends primarily on its ability to keep the ship from suffering a degradation in its
operational readiness, and this effectiveness translates directly into minimization of
damage. Thus, the goal is not to maximize effectiveness as much as it is to minimize
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Figure 23: The Damage Control System-in-Focus (With Communications)
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effect. Resources fall primarily into three categories: personnel, equipment, and time.
Of the three, personnel is perhaps the most important, especially with respect to the
number of highly-trained personnel. This resource is limited, non-expendable, and slowly
decreases with time (due to fatigue, injury, etc.). In fact, these personnel are often the
first casualties of a Mass Conflagration, leaving the remainder of the relatively untrained
ship's force to combat the fire.
Equipment is a limited, expendable resource, and is normally present in sufficient
quantity to cope with the environment. One exception to this is the Mass conflagration,
in which such expendable equipment resources as AFFF cannisters, Oxygen Breathing
Apparatus (OBA) cannister, etc. often reach critically low levels of reserver.
Time, as a resource, is defined for our purposes as the time needed to contain the
fire or, conversely, the time remaining until the fire bums out of control. By its very
nature, time is a limited, expended resource, and the amount of time available depends
primarily on environmental factors.
Having determined the various factors of the design problem, it can now be defined
in terms of resources, the environment, and organizational technology. Figure 24 shows
the design problem for a Damage Control organization.
D. TECHNOLOGY AND COMMAND & CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS
In order to determine the sort of organizational technology currently employed by
the typical Damage Control organization, an analysis of the existing command and control





EQUIPMENT USED * EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE
PERSONNEL USED * PERSONNEL AVAILABLE
TIME USED * TIME AVAILABLE
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DAMAGE ENVIRONMENT
Figure 24: The Damage Control Design Problem
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organization falls within each of these characteristics, the type of technology (and,
therefore, the variety handling capacity and analyzability) can be ascertained.
1. Flexibility
The organization in question cannot be thought of as very flexible, and is, in
fact, very mechanistic in its methodology. Due to the dangerous nature of the
environment, strict safety procedures must be followed at all times. In addition, the
possibility exists that an overabundance of effort could cause as much damage as it
combats, as in the case of an excessive use of firefighting water. These factors, along
with others, do not leave much room for flexibility.
2. Formalization
The DC organization is highly formalized, in the sense that most actions and
decisions are expressly governed by a specific set of written criteria. Using the Main
Space Fire as an example, nearly every single action taken by the Repair Party, from
space entry to desmoking and toxic gas checks, is predetermined and controlled by the
Main Space Fire Doctrine. This document is often highly detailed and specific to the
point of listing, for example, each and every valve, fuse, and relay that must be shut to
isolate the space involved.
3. Centralization
While decisions are made at all echelons of the DC chain of command, most
are made at the higher levels. The degree to which this is accomplished can vary, as each
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ship tailors its organization, but standard Navy guidelines often dictate that decisions
involving dangerous or hazardous conditions be made by higher authority.
4. Skill Level of Personnel
Repair Locker personnel are, in general, highly trained in their jobs. In a well-
run DC organization, training and evaluation takes place weekly, with emphasis on
repetition of vital and important areas. Ship's force personnel outside of the Repair
Lockers, on the other hand, are relatively untrained. Despite a requirement that all ship's
force personnel maintain general DC qualifications, the average crew member,
comparatively speaking, does not have the level of knowledge and experience found in
Repair Locker personnel, and is not able to respond to change in the environment as
effectively.
5. Span of Control
In this instance, span of control is slightly ambiguous. Due, once again, to the
variable nature of ship and organization size, a Repair Locker can contain anywhere
between 25 and 250 people. Another way of viewing span of control involves the
number of functions reporting to and working for an individual. Using this as the
criterion, the span of control for the DC organization can be evaluated somewhere
between wide and moderate. This is primarily due to the fact that the Locker Leaders are
required to control a large number of various teams, functions, and equipment; while the
On Scene Leader (OSL) directs the immediate actions of the repair party, he is also a
relay point for directives from the DCA and Locker Leader.
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6. Communication and Coordination
Within the typical Damage Control hierarchy, vertical communication and
coordination dominates. In fact, for the Main Space Fire, horizontal communication is
virtually nonexistent. Nearly all allocation of resources and support is principally
controlled by Damage Control Central. Figure 23 emphasizes this trend towards isolation
of subordinate units and the pivotal role of DC Central. Interdependence, when it does
exist, is pooled, and mutual support and other coordination efforts are almost entirely
absent unless coordinated through the Damage Control Assistant.
Using Table 1 from Chapter n, we see that the technology that best fits the DC
organization as described above matches a Routine technology in five of the six
categories. The one exception, skill level of personnel, would seem to create a paradox,
at least on the surface. Normally a formal, centralized organization operates as such
because of the relatively low levels of personnel skill. This does not always have to be
the case, however. The Navy's mechanistic organizational approach results primarily
from an underlying concern with military discipline and ship safety, not because personnel
skill levels require it to operate in such a manner.
E. THE DAMAGE CONTROL DECISION MAKING PROCESS
1. Problem Uncertainty
Problem identification is a relatively straightforward process in Damage
Control, given that the location and nature of the damage have been accurately and
properly reported. Problem solution is well-defined, and is covered by various standard
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procedures for each type of damage scenario (as long as the size is not unmanageable).
For example, there are four basic classes of fires encountered onboard:
• Class Alpha - ash-producing fires involving material such as wood, paper, etc.
• Class Bravo - fuel and other petroleum fires
• Class Charlie - electrical fires.
• Class Delta - special fires such as magnesium fires and deep-fat fryer fires.
The recommended firefighting agent for each class of fire has been
predetermined, and procedures for fighting each class have been laid out in numerous
doctrines. Problem uncertainty, therefore, is quite low.
2. Goal Consensus and Technical Knowledge
Following the above discussion on problem uncertainty, the related parameters
of goal consensus and technical knowledge are both very high. For a shipboard fire of
"normal" proportions, the ship's leadership is able to agree almost completely on the
actions necessary to put out the fire, as well as contain any collateral damage. Using the
framework shown in Figure 12, it can be seen that the decision-making process normally
employed by a typical Damage Control organization can be best represented by the
Management Scienct Model. The Management Science method of decision making is
well-suited for this type of mission-oriented, understandable organization, and is quite
effective when dealing with damage of moderate proportions. A Mass Conflagration,
however, introduces a more chaotic note into the DC problem, and lends itself less readily
to a cut-and-dried solution process. This topic, and the recommended changes necessary
to deal with it, will covered further in Chapter V.
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F. SUMMARY
Table 3 shows a synopsis of the above organizational analysis. The DC
organization has been classified as a Routine technology with primarily vertical linkage
and pooled interdependence, with decision making based on the Management Science
model. Comparing the variety handling capacity of our organization to the variety
generated by the two damage scenarios described in Chapter II, we can see that, while
the current methods employed by the Damage Control organization are adequate for the
Main Space Fire, they fall well below the requirements needed to cope with a mass
Conflagration. Chapter V will look more closely at this disparity, and will advance
certain changes and adaptations to the DC organization in order to effectively deal with
the more complex environment.
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TABLE 3





Skill Level of Personnel High/Medium




Problem Identification Uncertainty Low
Problem Solution Uncertainty Low
Goal Consensus High
Technical Knowledge High
Model Most Applicable Management Science
Technology Employed Routine
Variety Handling Capacity Low/Medium
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V. ADAPTING THE DAMAGE CONTROL ORGANIZATION
A. ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY
A review of Table 3 in Chapter IV points out the fundamental problem
experienced by the shipboard DC organization: a Routine technology does not possess the
variety handling capacity (VHC) necessary to cope with the demands of a Mass
Conflagration. Quite simply, the organization is too mechanistic to respond and act
sufficiently in the face of a highly chaotic situation. Obviously, what is needed is to shift
the organizational technology towards greater VHC while maintaining the inherent
military protocol and procedure which are mandatory in any shipboard organization. In
order to accomplish this, Figure 17, which provides a list of organizational characteristics
and their relationships to variety handling capacity, can be utilized as a template to
determine which adjustments can be made to the organization. Certain of these
characteristics will be addressed, and recommended modifications proposed.
B. DECENTRALIZATION
One of the most common errors made by ships is that the key leadership personnel
onboard are often situated in two or three vital spaces around the ship, and loss of one
of these spaces could effectively decapitate the command and control organization. [Ref
1] Since a Mass Conflagration can, and often does, isolate the forward and aft ends of
the vessel, steps should be taken to ensure that key personnel, such as the Commanding
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Officer, Executive Officer, and Chief Engineer, are not located in close proximity. Not
only does this reduce the likelihood of losing all of the principal leaders to one casualty,
it also establishes the framework for instituting an expanded C2 network for damage
control efforts.
C. THE SPAN OF CONTROL
The Damage Control Assistant often assumes the role of micromanager, controlling
the most minor details and receiving progress reports on nearly every phase of the DC
operation. [Ref. 1] The same is true of the Locker Leader and Bridge. While this
arrangement might work fine for smaller damage scenarios, the personnel in charge can
quickly find themselves overwhelmed by minutiae when confronting a more complex,
dynamic situation. For example, consider the means by which most DC information is
transmitted and recorded: the Damage Control Triangle. As can be seen in Figure 25, the
DC Triangle is a fast, effective way of relating data about damage, while its simplicity
makes it applicable to everything from fires to stretcher bearers. The major drawback to













Time remaining on Oxygen Breathing Apparatuses
Desmoking and gas freeing procedures
If the above items of information are relayed for every space or area on fire during
a Mass Conflagration, the DCA and Locker Leaders will quickly become overwhelmed.
The DC Triangle is data , not information, and the solution is to redefine the nature of the
information. To do this, two properties about each piece of data need to be determined:
the scope of its effects, and the danger it represents. For instance, only those items of
information whose scope includes ship wide systems or major areas of the ship should
be relayed to the DCA; similarly, only those items which pose a danger to vital ship's
systems should be relayed. Concurrent with this change should be a shift in the level at
which decisions are made. While it is true that the DCA should be concerned with all
damage, no matter how minor, he does not have the time to make every decision for the
ship, just as the Locker Leader does not have the time to make every decision for his area
of responsibility. By refining the data at the lowest levels into useful information, the key
leaders will have the time to review the information, weigh options and make decisions.
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A
FIRE REPORTED FIRE CONTAINED FIRE OUT
(NAME)
(LEVELS)
OVERHAUL IN PROG. REFLASH WATCH SET TOXIC GAS CHECK DONE
Additional notations made on the level of firefighting
water and desmoking
SPACE RESTORED
Figure 25: An Example of the Damage Control Triangle
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D. COORDINATION AND INTERDEPENDENCY
1. Vertical and Horizontal Linkage
As shown in Figures 14 and 17, the current form of vertical linkage used by
the typical DC organization - the Vertical Information System - has the highest variety
handling capacity; unfortunately, it also calls for a very high degree of vertical
coordination. Conversely, the current form of horizontal linkage most commonly used -
messages - has the lowest VHC while requiring the least amount of horizontal
coordination. Variety handling capacity can be increased, but only at the cost of
increasing the amount of coordination (either vertical or horizontal) required.
2. Integrating Managers and Liaisons
One solution which achieves an optimum combination of variety
handling capacity, increased horizontal coordination, and decreased vertical coordination
is the establishment of liaisons and integrating managers between the On Scene Leader
and Locker Leaders levels of the hierarchy. Figure 26 illustrates the basic idea behind
these concepts. [Ref. 3:p. 98] Junior officers and senior enlisted personnel should be
placed in these positions, with the primary purpose of acting as "Sub-Locker" Leaders,
i.e., they keep the Locker Leader informed on important information, while also
coordinating the efforts of the various DC parties in their area. Figure 27 shows an
organizational diagram which includes the use of integrating managers and liaisons.
Certainly, the vertical information system and message procedures will remain in place,
but the addition of integrator/liaisons will have the following effects on the organization:
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• The amount of vertical coordination is reduced, freeing the upper levels of the
command chain to concentrate on more critical issues.
• The span of control is narrowed, thereby increasing variety handling capacity.
• The integrator/liaisons also receive and relay information from the scene, refining
the data from the On Scene Leader and thereby reducing the information flow up
the hierarchy.
• Two or more liaisons within a Repair Locker can coordinate with each other (under
the cognizance of the Locker Leader), resulting in a more efficient allocation of
personnel and other resources
3. Interdependency
The difficulty with the current form of interdependency - pooled - lies not as
much with the type of interdependency as with the level at which resource allocation is
made. As mentioned before, a Mass Conflagration often isolates sections of the ship, and
both serial and reciprocal interdependency require a closer proximity of units. If,
however, pooled interdependency were to occur at the integrator/liaison level, then
interdependency at the Locker and ship-wide levels can be viewed as reciprocal. Figure
28 shows an example of this concept. If Integrator A has been given the task of
containing the fire in his location, but discovers that he has more hosehandlers or
investigators than he needs, he can reassign these resources to a more needy repair party
in Integrator B's area. As long as each Integrator/liaison ensures that the current task is
being fulfilled, they can coordinate with each other and share resources as needed. This
also establishes a mechanism whereby the Locker Leader and/or the DCA can accomplish
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Figure 26: Liaisons and Integrating Managers
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PARTY 1 > REPAIRPARTY 2
> PRIMARY MEANS OF RESOURCEALLOCATION (RECIPROCAL)
SECONDARY MEANS OF RESOURCE
ALLOCATION (POOLED)
Figure 28: Example of Proposed Interdependency
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4. Communications
Of course, given the expanded and more complex nature of the changes
mentioned above, communications must also expand to meet the requirements of more
horizontal coordination. The numerous sound-powered phone circuits, walkie-talkies, and
ship's announcing (MC) circuits found on most ships make the establishment of a flexible
communications network feasible, if somewhat complex. One system in particular, the
Damage Control Wire-Free Communications (DC WFCOM) system, makes the
establishment of such a network relatively simple. A key point to remember in designing
the DC communications network for Mass Conflagration is to ensure that it is flexible and
adaptable. Primarily, this means building redundancy into the system; a major casualty
to the ship often destroys one or more of the normal intra-ship communications system,
and secondary and even tertiary circuits must be provided for when available. Also, the
ship's DC organization should not become too reliant on one particular system. Some
ships that had DC WFCOM were unable to react and adapt to a casualty to that system
during MASS CONFLAG exercises, because they had relied on it exclusively, and had
to build another network from the ground up, causing numerous vital delays. [Ref. 1]
E. FORMALIZATION AND PERSONNEL SKILL
Paradoxically, of all the command and control characteristics discussed in this
chapter, formalization is the one which remains unchanged. The ship's Damage Control
organization is part of a formal military one, and any organizational changes that take
place must do so within this context. This constraint is necessary, and must be taken into
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account when modifications to the DC organization are made. It should also be pointed
out that these modifications apply only to Mass Conflagrations and other damage
scenarios of that scope, and the current setup used by the Navy does not need to be
redrawn from scratch; the basic DC organization has proven to be highly efficient for
most types of damage scenarios, and should remain unchanged for those situations.
The changes described above will only be effective in the long run if they are made
an integral part of the formal ship's organization. In order to ensure that this is achieved,
each ship should create an addendum to the Ship's Battle Bill, particularly the General
Quarters (GQ) assignments, which assigns each person onboard a duty station in the event
of a declared Mass Conflagration. This administrative modification would seem, on the
surface at least, to be nothing more than additional paperwork headache. It is critical,
however, that the changes and adaptations described above be institutionalized. Many
ships have employed some of these changes for Mass Conflag drills, or have been forced
to do so by combat circumstances, but there was little or no "corporate memory", i.e.,
continuity was not maintained. Formalizing not only ensures continuity, it provides for
the constant turnover in personnel experienced by every ship.
The Mass Conflag plan should also include communications assignments and areas
of responsibility, while remaining flexible enough to allow for other demands on the
ship's personnel, such as those in key combat roles. This change to the Ship's Bill
should have an inherent redundancy built in to personnel assignments, so that the ship is
ensured of having each billet within the DC organization filled regardless of personnel
casualties, combat assignments, etc. Since the circumstances, as well as the impact upon
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the GQ Bill, are different for each ship, the administrative change should be tailored to
the specific vessel; for example, an amphibious warship might simply include embarked
Marines into its Mass Conflag DC organization, while a reserve Perry-class Frigate will
need to make fundamental modifications to its personnel assignments during GQ.
In conjunction with this, personnel training must be expanded to include Mass
Conflagration. Personnel turnover on every ship is a constant influence, and only a
controlled, mandatory training program will be able to lessen the confusion during a
major casualty to the ship. This program is not as involved as it may seem; each person
onboard is already required to maintain a General DC qualification, and additional
training in firefighting, coordinating, etcv can be conducted by those personnel
permanently assigned to Repair Lockers. The key here is that each person must be aware
of his assigned duty, trained to perform that duty, and able to shift on short notice into
his Mass Conflag station.
F. SUMMARY
If done properly, the inclusion of the modifications described above into the typical
Damage Control organization will increase the ability of that organization to cope with
the increased environmental variety intrinsic to a Mass Conflagration. To summarize the
changes needed:
• Decentralize the ship's battle organization to prevent loss of leadership.
• Lower the level at which decisions are made and resources are allocated, with a
commensurate reduction in the amount and nature of information relayed up the
chain of command.
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• Establish integrating managers and liaisons to assist the Locker Leaders and On
Scene Leaders, and use them to increase the amount of horizontal coordination
between Repair Parties.
• Create a flexible, adaptable communications network which can still operate upon
the loss of primary, or even secondary, circuits.
• Formalize these changes, creating a Mass Conflagration Bill as an addendum to the
Ship's Battle Bill.
• Establish a program of personnel training so that the above changes can be
instituted with a minimum of confusion.
Most ships will be able to improve their chances of surviving by instituting a formal
doctrine that anticipates the chaotic environment of a Mass Conflagration.In this era of
modern warfare, with its hard-to-detect, difficult-to-kill weapons, ship survivability has
come to depend more and more on the ability of the ship's personnel to deal with massive
damage, and the Damage Control organization must adapt to this environment in order
to keep the ship afloat.
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